Hendrix's Eccentric Commentary

10/15/2024

For the first two years of the war in Ukraine I was publishing periodic observations about the war.  What follows below is my attempts to offer a larger perspective.  I like to think there are some insights here, they might well be little more than BSOTO (blinding statements of the obvious).

1. The taboo has been broken: once again warfare to change the borders of a nation-state is an option in foreign relations.  The genie is out of the bottle
   
2. We all thought that the days of massive invasions of another sovereign countries with tanks, artillery and aircraft were past.  We expected counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, hybrid war, or some other variant but not large scale conventional war,  We were all wrong.
    
3. As every one is saying , we are now in the age of “Great Power Competition” and conventional war between powers has returned. 
   
4. The Unites States and the rest of the Western World has NOT been able to rally the the global South and global East to support Ukraine.  It is hard not too see this as the poisonus fruits of the Iraq War coming home to roost.  (To violently mix a metaphor.)
   
5. The United States and the rest of the World has NOT been able to muster the economic muscle necessary to isolate Russia and do enough damage to cause them to back down. We have inflicted pain, but not enough, and the Russian economy has seemed to adapt. 
   
6. Russian trade patterns that used to move west are now moving east and south.  More broadly this suggest that the United States and the Western World can no longer be said to dominate the world’s economy.
   
7. The United States and the Western World no longer have a decisive technological edge in weaponry. As Andrew Krepinevich has observed ,the precision guided weaponry revolution has spread to the extent that Iran can now supply PGM’s  to Hezbollah and the Houthi’s.  You can argue that Western weapons are still generally superior, but the fact that the West has not yet built hypersonic missiles suggest that this is not always the case.
   
8.   Moreover the Unites States and the rest of the Western World together has NOT been able to produce enough munitions to keep one war going.  This should be seen as terrifying.
   
9. Every modern war seems to have its signature weapon systems:  in the Great War (World War I) it was barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery.  In World War II it was tanks and warplanes  In the Ukraine War it is obviously drones and satellites.  What is easy to overlook are the developments behind these signature weapon systems.  The developments fall under the rubric that the military helpfully labels C3I: Command, control, communications, and intelligence. Behind the barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery of the Great War lay aerial reconnaissance and photography, sound ranging, “predicted” artillery fire (plotting indirect artillery fire off a map) and carefully coordinated division, corps and army size attacks, where the typewriter, carbon paper, and file cabinets were as important as any other development.  Behind the glamorous tanks and warplanes of World War II lay radio, radar, traffic analysis, codebreaking, electronic warfare and most importantly plotting rooms and fusion centers:  operation and intelligence centers that put information together and displayed it for decision making;  the quintessential example was the combat information center on warships (CIC).  For the Ukraine War the satellites (like the Starlink system) and drones, and many other sources, have offered unprecedented information flow — if you can get the information through and render it into usable form.  Big Data analysis, the so-called “Big Blue Wall where (a more or less) complete picture is presented for decision making  is the Ukraine War’s big development — it you can keep the system operating.  If you can do all that, drones and PGM’s offer unprecedented opportunities to attack to the extent that the Ukrainians have found it cost effective to stalk individual Russian soldiers with cheap drones. 
   
10. The days of manned aircraft penetrating any depth into defended airspace seems to have come very close to ending.  The ability of an integrated air defense system to stop most incursions has dramatically increased.  The airspace is so dangerous that ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as cruise missiles and drones are now the air weapons of choice.  The display of prowess by the Israeli air defense system against air attack by Iran only reinforces this point.
    
11. Tanks and other AFV’s are probably obsolescent.  It is revealing that the Russians are sometime covering their tanks with screening, making them look like boxes to try to detonate HEAT rounds prematurely.  In the contest between armor and antitank weapons of various sorts, the antitank weapons seem to be winning. 

Some (Informed) Speculations

1. The overarching lesson of the Ukraine War is that if Ukraine had nukes the Russians would not have attacked.  Nuclear proliferation WILL happen. Outside of NATO, it is hard to believe that any country will trust another countries nuclear umbrella to shield them from trouble.  The logical decisions for Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and on the other side of fence, Iran, is to pursue nuclear weapons, probably semi-covertly like Israel and Iran.
    
2. Alliance systems are also look good:  even while not formally part of NATO Ukraine has got significant aid from the alliance.  Like it or not, the rest of the world will increasingly be driven into increasingly formal alliance.  The so-called “Axis of Autocracy” will become more and more formalized as well.  Who will ally with whom, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, is the big question.  The world will, however, be multipolar and the West is not the obvious choice as either winner or the good guys.  India is the giant wild card and will, quite reasonably, try to play a balancing, third-party role.
    
3. Along with manned aircraft and AFV;s it seems likely that surface warships are obsolescent, at lest to any depth into a denied area.  In particular, the aircraft carrier is nothing more than a big fat target in a world of ubiquitous satellite surveillance, drones, hypersonic missiles and swarm attacks.  Conversely, its armament:  manned short-range aircraft, are no longer  all that useful.  If the Navy wants big surface ships, start build arsenal ships that can launch cruise missiles from a range of multiple thousands of miles.
   
4. The invisible battlefield isn’t anymore.  With the proliferation of satellites, drones, and sensors of all sorts, reducing the signature of everything becomes the number one priority.
   
5. Conversely, with the proliferation of satellite constellations and drones, the idea of shutting down the other sides C3I with a few anti satellite strikes at the start of a war (a “Space Pearl Harbor) seems unlikely.  Attacks on the other sides C3I will be constant but are unlikely to be decisive.
   
6. Along with big fat target aircraft carriers, it has to be questioned if money spent on the next generation of destroyers, frigates, tanks, 6th generation fighters, and so on, is money well spent.  What exactly to spend it on instead is not immediately clear, though AI, big data, and directed energy weapons are the obvious candidates.
   
7. Weapons will evolve from smart to brilliant, and given the likelihood of data links being compromised by electronic warfare along with development of AI, they will become increasingly autonomous as well.  Given communications breakdowns, (and if they have not already started doing so) in spite of good intentions to keep humans in the loop, weapons will be making their own attack and kill decisions.
   
8. We will need to be prepared to raise much larger militaries, particularly armies.  The small highly trained (technical volunteer to use John Lynn’s formulation) army is no loner adequate for long large scale wars.  Better motivation, training, and leadership, are wasting assets.  As a war drags on, as in Ukraine, the advantages of motivation, training, and leadership wear away as the smaller army suffers relatively more from the effects of casualties, fatigue and war weariness than the larger army.  The armies tend to equality in effectiveness which means the larger army has an advantage that grows.  A small, even much better, army must win quickly, otherwise a large army will be needed, and the Ukrainian War suggest quick wins might be more difficult or even impossible with peer competitors. 
   
   
   Jacqueline L. Hazelton
9. So many thoughts.
10. 1) This changing of borders has already happened, with good intentions and no good outcomes, albeit without warfare. Think Sudan and South Sudan. There have been warfare examples, e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh Azurbaijan-Armenia; Ethiopia-Tigray; the Balkans wars; Myanmar-Rohingya; Somalia-Somaliland, Yemen; Israel-Hamas …
11. 2) “We all thought that the days of massive invasions of another sovereign countries with tanks, artillery and aircraft were past.” But the Gulf War and the Iraq war are not so long ago.
12. 3) Great power competition, sure, but these are not great power wars, fortunately. At least not yet.
13. 4) U.S. not rallying Global South and East to Ukraine: True and interesting. I think it’s been brewing for a longer time than the Iraq war, though. I’d go back to WWI and U.S. disavowals of support for nationalist movements despite Wilson’s call for self-determination. Then after WWII the fights for independence from the great powers.
14. 5) Yes, unsurprisingly. Other states will profit from trade with Russia and with sanctions, they profit more. It’s an indication to me that the white-black terms the West sees in the Ukraine-Russia war is a desire for a war worth fighting and winning after the GWOT. The rest of the world suffered from the GWOT. They didn’t need to learn that the GWOT was high cost for smaller states and hypocritical on the part of the West.
15. 6) I expect U.S. domination of the global economy to last for at least another 40 years or so. It serves the interests of more than the United States. But U.S. tariff increases will hurt the United States most short and long term.
16. 7) The Western states have nukes. That’s a significant advantage still. We’re seeing more in the way of lower tech tactical innovation than any strategic shifts. Also there are problems with the legend of the hypersonic weapon. It’s more about its ability to avoid identification than anything else. Good piece from CRS here: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf. Agree on the spread of ballistic missiles but is this a tactical shift or an operational one? I don’t see a strategic shift.

1. Munitions: The problem is not capacity, it’s will. If the United States made the policy decision to ramp up production of materiel it could do so.
2. 9) re signature weapons systems, nice summary! One problem with big data, though, is a) inability to master it effectively, which the United States has struggled with throughout the GWOT, and b) the experience the Ukrainians report with jamming. Re drones etc., these are tactical strikes on individual soldiers. I don’t see drones making a strategic difference any time soon.
3. 10) Conventional defense still has the advantage when forces are trained and equipped, is one big message of the Ukraine war. But the problem with conventional air defences is the same as with Star Wars: only a few projectiles are likely to get through but they can do a hell of a lot of damage.
4. Now my brain is tired.
5. 11) agree. Again, defense is dominant.
   
   
   Scott N. Hendrix

Jacqueline L. Hazelton Thanks for commenting. You generally make strong points and I agree with much. I’ll think tonight and try to say something intelligent tomorrow.

Scott N. Hendrix

Jacqueline L. Hazelton Sorry, I meant to comment on your comments <<Grin>> earlier but I have been under the weather. With one exception what I have are probably only slightly more than quibbles.

1). Yes, there have been movements of borders, but a major power invading a neighbors to take land and set up a puppet government seems to me to be a major violation of norms, rather as if we decided we wanted chunks of Mexico and wished to put in a place a puppet government. (And yes, that did happen before but that was nearly two centuries ago.). This does seem to violate to a significant taboo.

2). Yes the Gulf War and Iraq Wars were major land operations but, at least in theory, that was not to change borders. There was a widespread belief that future wars would take different for. Before February 2022 I was constantly reading about “Hybrid” War not tanks rolling across the countryside. To be fair, by most accounts Putin surprised his own people more than he surprised us.

3). This is not a Great Power War, agreed, but it sure looks like from here that we, and NATO, are fighting a proxy war with Russia, and Putin and his crew sure seem to think so too.

4). You are certainly right that the US’s failure to live up to its language of self-determination dates back to Wilson and World War I, at least outside of a narrow swath of Europe and not even all of that. The (partial) counter-argument is that in two many parts of the world, like the Balkans, different ethnic groups are too intermixed to make it possible. I have read an argument that the Balkans, and other parts of Eastern Europe, have never had the stability they had under the Hapsburgs, since the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell.

5). I totally agree, it was inevitable that Russia would find other markets for its energy and thereby new trading partners. The hangover from the GWOT simply made bad worse.

6). I think that you are correct that the US will continue to hold a strong position in the world economy and I think your point that many other players have a vested interest in this continuing will help the US keep that position is strong. I am not sure, however, that “domination” is the right word, I no longer think we have that level of influence. I might go for the phrase “supremacy. (As in the distinction between “air supremacy,” and “air dominance.”) We have strong influence in the way economic affairs in the world go, we no longer can force them to go the way we want.

7). I am not convinced that nukes have that much effect any more, with the major exception that they can deter outright invasion or complete defeat (i.e. if Ukraine had nukes, it might have been enough to deter Russia). Otherwise I think that ability to deter attacks against allies, for instance South Korea, is overstated. Would we really risk a nuclear exchange with North Korea if the North Koreans nuked South Korea? I am dubious. I think that the US has extended its nuclear umbrella way too far. If I were South Korean I would not rely on us and would be seeking, probably covertly, my own nuclear deterrent.

A for other weaponry development, it is certainly true that hypersonic missiles are over-hyped — at the moment. They are, however, also in an early stage of development, what will they be capable of in five or ten years? More broadly, however, I think that they signify that the US no longer has a monopoly on PGM’s — that PGM technology has massively proliferated.

Munitions: here I must disagree with you. Our ability to produce warships, for instance, is incredibly limited. Even with every warship yard in the US working flat out, the US fleet will shrink for at least the next ten years, if not more. It doesn’t matter how much money Congress throws at the problem, the yards and workers aren’t there to produce more warships. (And this doesn’t even consider the point that there really isn’t a merchant shipbuilding industry left in the US so there is no easy options to quickly convert or develop new shipyards, let alone build the shipping we will need if a major war breaks out.). About a year ago the US Army told us it would take two years to double the production of 155mm projectiles because there were almost no places left making them. The US Navy is concern that they cannot get enough missiles. There is real concern that we are giving too many Patriot SAMs to the Ukraine and THAADS to Israel and don’t have enough for our own use if something happens. If we do want tanks, and I am not certain we do, there is only one assembly like left to make them. This list goes on and on. I am not convinced, that even if we made the decision to invest in munitions we could become the “Arsenal of Democracy” again. We don’t have the manufacturing base and we are not the manufacturing giant relative to the rest of the world. In fact, there is a better chance that China would become the “Arsenal of Autocracy.”

Here is some historical perspective. The US first began trying to grow the US Navy in 1936 (when it decided to build to treaty limits) when Japan left the Washington Naval Treaty. There was another boom in funding in fall 1940 when Congress became alarmed at what was going on in Europe. And of course, right after Pearl Harbor there was another huge bump in funding. More generally we can say that the US mobilization for World War II began in the fall of 1940, when all those munition contracts were let, the National Guard was mobilized and peacetime conscription began. With all that, the American cornucopia of men, munitions and warships did not really begin flowing until about the second quarter of 1943 — and that was with a full wartime mobliziation. It is hard to believe that the US and the West will engage in that level of mobilization anytime soon, so I am dubious that it is just a matter of making the decision and if the decision was made, as I said, I am dubious that the industrial base is available to do so.

9). As for Big Data and Drones I agree that there is still a lot of work left to make the systems operate — but again we are still early in the development of these technologies. They will probably improve and the developments in AI promises to hypercharge that improvement. You are quite right that electronic warfare and cyberattacks will constantly threaten the system, but that is, in effect what a big part of the next big war will be — taking down the enemies C3I system or getting inside his OODA loop or whatever acronym you want to muster. I agree that ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, PGMs, drones and whatever other lethal toys they develop do not seem to shift the strategic balance but the operational and tactical effects are potentially gigantic. As I have suggested surface ships might be unable to operate in denied areas and the ability to deny areas and the size of the area denied have dramatically increased. Hypersonic missiles developed by the Chinese are explicitly described as “carrier killers.” I am also dubious about the future of AFV’s. These new operational limits will probably have strategic implications, particularly for naval warfare.

10 and 11). You put it more succinctly than I did.. The defense is dominant. On land, in the air, and probably at sea, to put it in ground war language: you can, with enough time, planning, resources, and effort, break in, but breakthroughs, and breakouts, seem just about impossible. You can grind forward and attrit your enemy which means the bigger side, if they are willing to make the sacrifices, wins. The analogy everyone is making with the Great War seems very apt and there are the trench lines to prove it.

My fingers are tired.

Jacqueline L. Hazelton

Scott N. Hendrix I hope you are feeling better! Just two replies. Nukes are be definition defensive, a deterrent. Re self-determination, the ethnic conflict literature shows that we see ethnic conflict not when various ethnicities and faiths are all mixed up together, but only under certain circumstances. One is when a leader decides to try to privilege one group, as in the Balkans. Another is when there is a small majority of one type feeling threatened by the minority. In both Yugo and Iraq, for example, no one was going about asking what one’s ethnicity or faith was. People just married each other and interacted like they were all the same. This is one reason why the U.S.-written constitution is such a disaster; it laid out faith-based quotas where this kind of thinking did not exist previously. One might have thought that the French-designed quota system in Lebanon would have proved a negative example, but no …

Scott N. Hendrix

Jacqueline L. Hazelton You certainly know more about ethnic conflict than I do. Moreover, I can only agree that the US attempt to resolve the sectarian conflict in Iraq created more sectarian conflict, indeed I recall reading some people expressing that opinon at the time. I can only also agree that Lebanon does not seem a great model to follow in trying to balance sectarian interests.