5/10/2025
I have argued before that the appearance of swarms of drones, ones that are that are now cheap enough to be used to hunt individuals, and to create an engagement era that is currently forty kilometers or so across (the “gray zone”), amounts to a genuine military revolution; one that is as big as the appearance of gunpowder weapons on the battlefield at the end of the fifteenth and start of the sixteenth century and their rapid rise to dominate the battlefield.
This drone revolution s already creating drastic changes, and it will therefore become necessary to change some basic assumptions.
One of these basic assumptions is that the first purpose of the soldiers’ individual weapon is to fight other soldiers. In a sense the primary purpose of the soldiers’ individual weapon is protective, to kill an enemy soldiers that might threaten him or her. This is not to deny that the individual weapon has an offensive purpose, or contributes to the outgoing fire in a firefight, but the majority of that sort of fire is the business of weapons from the squad automatic weapon and grenade launcher on up. The first purpose of the individual weapon has been antipersonnel protection.
The point is that the primary threat that the individual weapon needs to addresses has now changed: the individual weapon can no longer be solely an antipersonnel weapon. The primary danger to the individual soldier is now a drone, whether a small first person kamikaze drone, or one carrying a small charge, or larger observation drones that will call in fire, by most reports this has become the dominant killer on the battlefield. Many Ukrainian soldiers are now carrying shotguns to engage drones, and trying to deploy nets as a drone counter measure.
There are many proposed counter-drone measures under consideration, and it is safe to say that that is going to be the primary problem on the battlefield for years to come. Nonetheless we are already at the point where every soldier anywhere close to the battlefield will need a weapon that can provide a quick hard kill against small drones, at least.
This does not meant that the need for the individual weapon system to engage enemy soldiers has gone away, but it does suggest that the need for the individual weapon to be able to engage drones at close range is at least equally important and now probably more so.
Which leads me to the US Army. The US Army is in the process of fielding new small arms. The M7 Rifle and M8 Carbine are meant to replace the older M4 in the “close combat force.” Their principal virtue is that they fire a new 6.8 mm ,and were a response to conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan that led to calls for a weapon with more range and more penetration against body armor. They come with sophisticated optics that will allow (it is claimed) accurate fire out to distance of 800 meters or so.
Sadly, this seems to be a case of preparing to fight the last war. The primary need now is to have the capability to kill small fast moving drones at close ranges. It does not sound like the M7/M8 is remotely suited to do that.
I cannot pretend to know what the right solution is. (For what it is worth, I am thinking in terms of an over/under combination of an assault rifle combined with possibly a small 25-30mm grenade launcher firing buckshot or flechette rounds, or a very large bore shotgun.) Whatever is developed, however, the ergonomics will be crucial, every soldiers is going to have to carry this weapon, and have it easily available to use ALL THE TIME. The sling or carry arrangement must allow the soldiers to do other tasks and yet still be able to bring his or her weapon into action instantaneously. Ideally the weapon should be such that the soldiers can point and shoot at a small target (a small drone) within five meters or so. and snap off a shot, using the optics’ default settings, out to about fifteen meters. Since an antipersonnel weapon is also still required, the ability to engage personnel targets out to about 250 meters is still necessary, anything beyond this is gravy.
And this needs to be developed and delivered to the troops immediately, within the next year or so. A ten year, or twenty year development cycle is not an option, nor is turning to the “primary defense contractors for some magic new technology that will take too long, cost to much, and underperform. Someone needs to start slapping together off the shelf components right now. Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good enough.
Leave a comment